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Resolving the Auditor Liability Problem—An Appraisal of 
Some Alternatives 
Richard H . Murray 
Touche Ross & C o . 
Decades before others were discussing the problem of auditors' liability, 
indeed years before many of us were born, M r . Justice Cardozo masterfully 
defined the problem i n the Landmark case of Ultramares vs., Touche (then 
Touche, N i v e n & C o . ) : 
The defendants owed to their employer a duty imposed by law to 
make their certificate without fraud, and a duty growing out of contract 
to make it with the care and caution proper to their calling. . . . T o 
creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate, 
the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there 
was notice in the circumstances of its making that the employer d id not 
intend to keep it to himself. . . . A different question develops when 
we ask whether they owed a duty to these to make it without negligence. 
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the failure 
to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive entries, may 
expose accountants to a liability i n an indeterminate amount for an 
indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The hazards of a business 
conducted on these terms are so extreme as to enkindle doubt whether 
a flaw may not exist in the implication of a duty that exposes to these 
consequences. (Emphasis added, 255 N . Y . 170, 174 N.E.441) (1931) 
As a result of these concerns, the Ultramares decision held that, while 
auditors could be liable to their clients for simple negligence, they would have 
to be guilty of a considerably higher degree of fault in order to be liable i n 
damages to third parties. 
Post-Ultramares Developments 
While the Supreme Courts of most States quickly followed the lead of 
Ultramares i n cases involving claims against auditors, the first forty years after 
that decision saw a number of developments that ran counter to the Cardozo 
concern for avoiding destructive risks to the accounting profession: 
• The Federal Securities Laws enacted i n 1933 and 1934, contain specific 
provisions permitting the purchasers of corporate securities to recover 
damages from auditors for something akin to negligence. However, 
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those provisions were limited to specific claims, such as purchasers at 
an initial offering of securities (Section 11 of the 1933 A c t ) , or pur-
chasers relying upon documents filed with the S E C (Section 18 of 
the 1934 A c t ) . The Federal Laws were silent with respect to liability 
from market transactions generally, leaving the impression that the 
standards of the Ultramares decision were acceptable to the Congress 
and were intended to control all securities liabilities not specifically 
defined by the '33 and '34 Acts. 
• Beginning about twenty years ago, however, the Federal Courts began 
to engraft upon the Securities Laws the concept of implied rights of 
recovery for general trading activity i n corporate securities. This 
trend, focusing principally upon Rule 10(b) of the 1934 Act , and the 
Commission's related Rule 10(b)5, was a major piece of social legisla-
tion through judicial fiat. The extent of the philosophical change 
brought by the development of 10(b)5 liabilities is manifest in the 
fact that these new rights of action emerged wi th lower standards of 
liability (negligence or less) than the established standards of Ultra-
mares, and with none of the conditions or limitations upon liability 
(statute of limitations, statutory defenses, etc.,) which Congress had 
provided for the specific remedies in Section 11 and Section 18. 
• The past fifteen years have seen certain erosions of the Ultramares 
principle i n proceedings under common law and state law traditions, 
as well . Under the theory that more is always better in the case of 
plaintiff's rights of recovery, the American L a w Institute promulgated 
changes in its semi authoritative Restatement of Torts. The resulting 
expansion of the liability of auditors (and, for that matter, of attorneys, 
and for many other participants i n securities transactions) was charac-
terized by one court in 1968: "The wisdom of the decision in Ultra-
mares has been doubted . . . and this court shares the doubt. W h y 
should an innocent reliant party be forced to carry the weighty burden 
of an accountant's professional malpractice? Isn't the risk of loss more 
easily distributed and fairly spread by imposing it on the Accounting 
profession, which can pass the cost of insuring against the risk on to 
its customers, who can in turn pass the cost on to the entire consuming 
public? Finally, wouldn't a rule of foreseeability elevate the cautionary 
techniques of the Accounting profession?" (Rusch Factors, Inc., v. 
Levin , 284 F . Supp. 85) (1968) 
By the 1970's it was quite legitimate to question whether the Ultramares 
decision and the Cardozo fear of undue exposure was passe. Perhaps the fear 
expressed so many years before was overstated; at least, there had been no major 
disastrous judgments entered against accountants. Moreover, there seemed to 
be little sympathy or concern for the plight of an accounting profession which 
had prospered during the ensuing years. 
The Litigious Era 
Time and circumstances were, however, catching up with those who saw 
public benefit behind every suit against an accounting firm. The explosion of 
claims against accountants during the late 60's and early 70's was noted in 
many quarters (see, for example, Earle, "Accountants on T r i a l in a Theatre of 
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the A b s u r d " Fortune, May 1972, and Liggio, "Accountants' C i v i l Liabi l i ty : 
Through the Looking Glass and Other Impossible Th ings" A B A Lit igation 
Magazine, Volume 1). Although the voices of concern came initially from 
within the profession, the reality of the crisis caused by the number of claims, 
size of the recoveries sought, and the frustrations and expense of defending class 
action procedures were ultimately recognized by the U . S . Supreme Court. The 
first warning was struck in Blue Chip Stamps vs., Manor Drug Stores, (421 
U.S . 723) (1975): 
There has been widespread recognition that litigation under Rule 
10(b)5 represents a danger of vexatiousness different i n degree and i n 
k i n d from that which accompanies litigation in general. . . . W e believe 
that the concern expressed for the danger of vexatious litigation which 
could result from a widely expanded class of plaintiffs under Rule 
10(b)5 is founded in something more substantial than the common 
complaint of the many defendants who would prefer avoiding law suits 
entirely to either settling them or trying them. These concerns have two 
largely separate grounds. The first of these concerns is that in the field 
of Federal Securities Laws governing disclosure of information even a 
complaint which by objective standards may have very little chance of 
success at trial has a settlement value to the plaintiff out of proportion to 
its prospect of success at trial so long as he may prevent the suit from 
being resolved against h i m by dismissal or summary judgment. 
Pursuing this theme, the A I C P A Amicus Brief i n the Hochfelder case a few 
months later urged the court to recognize: 
D u r i n g their pendence, the charges leveled against a f i rm of Certified 
Public Accountants constitute a cloud on their professional reputation 
and a threat to their professional standing. The in terrorem effect of 
the pendency of even the more meritricious litigation provides a settle-
ment value i n such law suits having no relationship to the quantitative 
size or qualitative merit of the claim. 
The capstone of this development was the Supreme Court's decision i n 
Ernst & Ernst vs., Hochfelder, (425 U.S . 185) (1976). The Court noted the 
absurd contrast between the obvious language and purposes of the Federal 
Securities Acts and the uncontained potential for liability that had developed 
under the judiciary's creation of the 10(b)5 phenomena. A s a result, the Court 
held that civi l damage claims under the implied liability sections of the Federal 
Securities Acts could only be awarded upon proof that the accountant involved 
had been guilty of scienter, a knowing intent to violate the law. 
Most recently the N e w York Court of Appeals reaffirmed the principles of 
its earlier Ultramares decision, with only slight extensions of auditor liability, 
in the case of White vs., Guarente decided just last December. 
Cardozo's Fears Realized 
Thus, the theoretical concern expressed by Cardozo has come ful l circle. 
Ironically, graphic proof of the accuracy of Cardozo's fears did not mature until 
1977 when a California State Court jury rendered its decision in the U.S . 
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Financial Litigation. That verdict against Touche Ross of more than 27 mil l ion 
dollars results from a pattern of facts which clearly manifests the worst of the 
Cardozo fears: 
• The plaintiffs consisted of twenty four banks and insurance companies 
i n the U.S . and abroad who purchased notes privately placed by U.S . 
Financial without any registration proceedings or other advance indi-
cations that would give any warning that they would be relying upon 
financial statements at the time those statements were rendered. 
• The majority of plaintiff institutions made their investment decision 
on the basis of intermediary recommendations without obtaining or 
examining the financial statements which contained numerous foot-
notes disclosures creating doubt about the quality of the earnings 
reported. 
• The plaintiffs' losses on these notes resulted from a decline i n the 
general health and market value of real estate development firms 
like U.S . Financial, and in part from a pervasive scheme of fraud 
perpetrated by company management i n collusion with numerous 
third parties including officers of the company's principal com-
mercial bank. 
• Touche Ross was charged only with negligence in the conduct of 
its audits for 1970 and 1971; the plaintiffs specifically disclaimed any 
suggestion that Touche was guilty of either intentional or reckless 
conduct. 
• The jury, which cumulatively possessed no educational degrees be-
yond high school, was required to reach a verdict after nine months 
of trial which produced over 18 thousand pages of transcript and 
hundreds of exhibits arising from the numerous and complex issues. 
• The jury concluded, within the first hour of deliberations, that Touche 
Ross had been negligent and that the plaintiffs were therefore entitled 
to ful l reimbursement of all their losses plus pre-judgment interest.* 
It is clear that the past two years have seen both a judicial endorsement of 
the concerns originally expressed by Cardozo, and a manifestation of those fears 
in action. 
A Broader Problem? 
The recognition that the risk of civi l damage recoveries constitutes a major 
problem for the accounting profession is, however, only a start towards defining 
the problem. The more significant issue is the need to determine whether this 
phenomenon also constitutes a problem for broader national interests. A recent 
report by the Sub-Committee on Reports, Accounting and Management, of the 
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs (The Metcalf Committee) opined 
that " . . . potential legal liability for negligence is the most effective mechanism 
for assuring that independent auditors performed their public responsibility 
*The verdict has been appealed on a number of grounds, including our belief that the 
Ultramares standards should prevail in California to prevent such an investor recovery for 
simple negligence. We also believe that negligence by Touche Ross was not established at the 
trial. The case will be appealed on that ground as well. 
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competently and diligently." Whi le that is clearly the conclusion which the 
Committee's staff had hoped the Committee would reach, I don't believe that 
any of the testimony or written submissions submitted to the Committee in the 
course of its investigation gave any credence to that conclusion. Rather, the 
events of recent years have given credence to the position articulated by former 
S E C Commissioner A l Summer: 
The S E C is not unconcerned with the danger of excessive financial 
loss, for we recognize that an indigent profession, or one blighted wi th 
financial adversity, w i l l need to reduce its exposure and thereby lessen 
protection afforded investors. 
A Two-Fold Issue 
The issue thus presented is essentially two fold: Has the risk of liability 
stimulated improved performance by the accounting profession, and A r e the 
burdens of this risk more detrimental to the public interest than any such 
benefits? The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (the Cohen Commis-
sion) directly addressed the issue i n a staff study conducted by Professor Henry 
Jaenicke of Frankl in and Marshall College, later separately published as (Re-
search Study N o . 1 of the A I C P A ) , The Effect of Litigation on Independent 
Auditors. 
In that study, Jaenicke notes that the Accounting profession has been 
much more active in the past decade in developing accounting principles and 
auditing standards, and i n recognizing new ways in which it can serve the 
public. H e concludes that the principal reason for this activism is the fear of 
civi l liability. Professor Jaenicke acknowledges that his conclusion is based 
principally on the fact that both trends (professional activism and the litigation 
explosion) occurred at about the same time. That the latter has influenced the 
former seems unassailable; that fear is the primary motivation of professional 
service, however, seems to strain the available facts and rejects any recognition 
of the profession's own sense of responsibility and self-initiated goals. I suggest 
that the accounting profession has demonstrated more rapid acclimation to con-
temporary challenges and public needs than has any other institutional component 
of the social and commercial scene, including the American Bar, the business 
community and perhaps Congress itself. 
The dispute over what motivates professional improvements and how 
successful accountants have been in this regard is beyond the scope of this 
paper. A more meaningful question for present attention is: assuming that fear 
of liability has some salutary effect on the profession's concept of public responsi-
bility, is more always better, or have we reached (or perhaps passed) the optimum 
balance between the benefits and the detriments of that fear. I do not suggest 
that the Accounting profession or any major firm within it w i l l be destroyed by 
the burdens of litigation. Rather, I am concerned that fear of excessive liability 
w i l l deter the profession from serving the public as broadly and as effectively 
as it could. 
This concern has been expressed with increasing frequency in recent years, 
such as the observation of Russell E . Palmer that: 
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The Accounting profession may . . . be showing some reluctance to 
extend itself into new areas. In connection with two recent contro-
versies—Reporting on Interim Financial Statements and Reporting on 
Forecasts—the profession chose to debate and discuss rather than ac-
tively experiment. True, there are some difficult technical issues in each 
of these areas, but I am concerned that we may be using the conceptual 
questions to shield us from possible additional exposure to liability. 
("It's T i m e to Stop T a l k i n g , " Journal of Accountancy, October, 1975) 
The effect of such reluctance was noted by Mautz and Sharaf in their 1961 
monograph published by the American Accounting Association: 
First, the auditor appears to be renouncing his right to an area i n 
which he has competence and i n which he can be of service; Second, 
as a professional group auditors are in effect refusing to provide an ef-
fective service to the business community; T h i r d , auditors are empha-
sizing to clients and to the world at large their unwillingness to accept 
responsibility, to provide a difficult but useful service, to attempt to cope 
on even a small scale with an evil force that blights business life in no 
unsubstantial degree. (The Philosophy of Audi t ing) 
Future Directions 
I believe the available evidence demonstrates that the profession has reached 
the optimum level of reaction to litigation pressures and now faces the prospect 
of retrenchment from responsibility as a rational response to the escalation of 
such risks. N o w that the profession has firmly internalized the sense of public 
responsibility newly imposed upon it during the present generation, further i m -
provement i n the quality and diligence of performance w i l l depend on the pro-
fession's ability to recruit and retain the most competent people and our ability 
to foster courage and responsibility i n their actions. The continuance and escala-
tion of exposure to civi l liabilities places both of these goals i n jeopardy, particu-
larly as contrasted with the opportunities in the business world that are not so 
infected with risk. 
It is a common phenomenon of 20th Century U . S . social and political his-
tory for valuable and necessary trends to first reach and then exceed the resolu-
tion of the original needs. This tendency has often required legislative reform 
to seek a healthier permanent balance. This has been the case with the develop-
ment of unionism, the assertion of constitutional rights of criminal defendants, 
and numerous other economic and social issues. I suggest that we are at such 
a turning point i n the process by which the phenomenon of risk has been used 
to enroll the accounting profession in an expanding public service capacity. 
I submit that the accounting profession has reached a stage of maturity in these 
new responsibilities that can be threatened and eroded by the continuation and 
escalation of those risks. 
Possible Solutions Considered 
A recognition that the risks of litigation constitute an undue burden upon 
the public as well as the accounting profession requires us to examine some pos-
sible solutions. W e should turn first to a popular misconception—that insurance 
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provides all the protection the profession requires. T h e S E C and many pro-
tagonists of plaintiffs' rights profess that accounting firms can insure themselves 
against the risks of liability and pass the cost of such insurance on to their clients. 
This belief that the accounting profession is simply a conduit for spreading the 
risk to the business community and therefore to the ultimate consumer underlies 
the thinking of virtually all of the commentators who promote the concept of 
civil damage recoveries against auditors. I consider the proposition to be i l l 
founded for a number of reasons: 
• The continued availability of adequate levels of insurance coverage 
for the accounting profession i n this country is subject to considerable 
doubt. A s recently as the early 1970's coverage for the profession was 
available from numerous insurance companies who competed for our 
business in both price and benefits. Today only a handful of companies 
continue to provide coverage for accountants, and only with massive 
premium increases, sharp increases i n coverage restrictions, and man-
datory deductibles that render us substantially self insured. For ex-
ample, the B i g 8 has experienced a several hundred percent increase 
in premiums, for barely more than 50 percent of the total coverage 
once available, and a m i n i m u m 5 mil l ion dollar annual deductible, all 
i n the past three years. A n d we are lucky; smaller firms continue to 
struggle with the availability of coverage of any k i n d . 
• It is a fiction to believe that an accounting firm can directly pass on 
the entire cost of its litigation expense and insurance premiums i n the 
form of higher fees. The profession in the U.S. , particularly the na-
tional firms, are highly competitive and the profession as a whole is 
subject to demands by the business community for economizing i n 
professional services. A s a result, it is far more likely that the cost 
of litigation w i l l be absorbed in depressed personal incomes, or more 
regrettably from the public's viewpoint, in less recruiting, training 
and self improvement. 
• The public gets little benefit from the overall cost of litigation. A s 
Jaenicke points out, no more than one third of total damage awards 
ever finds its way into the public pocket, which is hardly productive 
to society as a whole. Other forms of insurance protection such as 
auto liability, personal health and accident, etc., are designed to achieve 
a preponderance of public recoveries as opposed to handling costs. 
I believe the estimate of one third public recoveries in the securities 
field to be unrealistically high (the subject is presently being studied 
by the Department of Justice) and even if accurate it hardly seems to 
justify the burdens imposed by the process. I am indebted to Henry 
H i l l , now retired from Price Waterhouse & Co. , for the observations 
that present class action litigation is mindful of the ancient practice of 
according justice by cutting off the ear of the malefactor and awarding 
it to the injured party. W e differ only i n that he does not refer to the 
making of ear amputations highly profitable to the lawyers who per-
form them. 
A n Alternative to Insurance 
If insurance is a non-solution to the liability problem, where can we look 
for more hopeful solutions? The Cohen Commission, despite its conclusion 
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that some risk is good for the profession and the public, endorses the American 
L a w Institute's proposal to l imit the amount of potential liability recoverable 
under the Federal Securities Act . That proposal, which is part of the A L I ' s sug-
gested recodification of the Federal Securities Laws, would l imit recoveries to 
the greater of one percent of the auditing firm's annual revenues, or one mi l l ion 
dollars. The limitation would not apply, however, to liabilities resulting from 
financial statement misrepresentations i n which the auditor had actual knowledge 
of fraud. The A L I explains this proposal as a balancing of the benefits and 
detriments of litigation risks: 
There must me some maximum . . . to prevent the possibility of utterly 
outlandish recoveries from material but nevertheless relatively insub-
stantial lapses. . . . The other side of the coin is that, unless the potential 
liability is high enough to attract able lawyers who are wi l l ing to under-
take class actions on a contingency basis there may not be any practical 
enforcement. . . . " (Reporter's Comments on Tentative Draft Number 
T w o , 1973) 
The A L I code has been in preparation for nearly a decade and has bene-
fited from an extraordinary amount of public and professional attention. A s you 
might expect, the proposed liability l imit has enjoyed the active support of the 
accounting profession. Unfortunately, despite all the effort and expertise behind 
it, I doubt that the proposed code w i l l fly through Congress without considerable 
political reshaping. If the recent active interest in the accounting profession by 
some Congressmen and staff members has a broad public constituency (which is 
an issue for another day) then the liability limitation could be in for tough 
sledding. 
Other Considerations 
Without regard to the fate of this A L I proposal, three other goals available 
to Congress and the courts alike, are worthy of consideration. The first deals 
with the standard for justifying liability of accountants. Specifically, I suggest 
the adoption of statutory or judicial standards akin to the principles of the 
Ultramares case: " A n y auditor or auditing can be held liable to its client for 
negligence, but should be liable to others (such as the investing public) only 
when guilty of criminal participation in that client's fraud or of a knowing failure 
to exercise its professional responsibilities. "Such a standard, which closely re-
sembles the Supreme Court's definition of scienter in Hochfelder, would not 
absolve auditors from serious professional failings. Rather, it would minimize 
the risk of being treated as an indemnitor of market losses in the guise of hind-
sight determinations of negligence. 
Second, the profession's own standards of conduct should be recognized as 
adequate defenses to charges of malpractice. Certain commentators and a hand-
ful of cases have suggested that judges and juries can ignore compliance with 
generally accepted accounting principles and generally accepted auditing stand-
ards if, with hindsight, they determine that the financial statements should have 
been differently presented. But if the profession is to be continually subjected 
to fear of liability as a stimulus towards effective performance, the profession 
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must have some confidence that effective performance can be measured i n ad-
vance of the difficult professional judgments it is required to make. Without 
the structure of G A A S and G A A P to rely upon, fear is more likely to produce 
the irrational results of guessing against the views of a judge or a jury than 
useful efforts to comply with established professional rules. Stated differently, 
if G A A S and G A A P are to apply only at the time judgments are made by an 
auditor and not at the time the judgments are made by a judge or jury, then 
there is no way that the accounting profession can convert its fear of liability into 
any meaningful form of public protection. 
T h i r d , in order to recover damages from accountants, plaintiffs should be 
required to establish a clear line between their losses and the misrepresentations 
alleged to have occurred i n financial statements. Courts have been increasingly 
w i l l i n g to ignore the traditional need for proof of reliance and causation i n 
order to facilitate recoveries by large classes of plaintiffs. The fiction used to 
cover this erosion of standards is the claim that financial statements can be as-
sumed to have an effect upon the market price of widely traded stocks, and that 
proof of individual investment decisions is unnecessary. Whi le this fiction 
greatly aids class action plaintiffs, it also serves to obliterate the effect of any 
other causes of plaintiff's loss, such as general market decline, industry-wide 
difficulty, or mismanagement of corporate affairs. W h e n these intervening causes 
of loss are, in effect, defined out of existence the accountants (and other de-
fendants in securities cases) are converted to insurers of all market losses when 
there has been financial statement error, even if the error had little effect on the 
value of securities. 
These three proposals are, of course, more complex than suggested by my 
comments, and they require careful scrutiny of possible negative effects. But 
each seems to be a limited and manageable objective within the present legal 
structure, and each offers attractive ways of containing the auditor liability 
problem. 
A F i n a l Observation 
None of the foregoing proposals, including the statutory limitation on 
liability, is intended to detract from the accounting profession's own obligation 
to contain its exposure through the careful and skil l ful rendering of services. 
But quality controls and professional responsibilities are already highly developed 
within the profession and the burdens of litigation continue to grow. I submit 
that the profession, and the public it serves, deserve a careful analysis and 
adoption of those measures which produce a realistic balance of responsibility 
and risk. 
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